

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 15 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. HAJEK

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELLO-FRANCO

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. de ALENCAR ABARIBE

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. J. E. G. HARDY

Mr. J. F. M. BELL

Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU

Mr. M. HAMID

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL

Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Mr. K. K. RAO

Mr. C. K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. A. A. ATTA
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. G. A. WESTRING
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I. G. USACHEV
Mr. V. N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-BRIAN
Mr. M. S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J. S. H. SHATTOCK
Mr. J. H. LAMBERT

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. D. MARK
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the thirty-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Today the United States delegation would like in turn to suggest some preliminary answers to the questions posed at our thirty-fifth plenary meeting by the representative of Sweden in regard to the Soviet and United States plans for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2, ENDC/30 and Corr.1). I say "preliminary" because in a very real sense we cannot provide definitive replies on some of these questions until there has been further discussion in this Committee which will involve examination in depth of many important problems.

The first question the representative of Sweden asked, on time limits for each stage, is one which has already received considerable attention from many speakers at many of our meetings. We agree that this is a major issue. Indeed, it is an issue on which definite answers will have to be agreed before we can conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The United States is clearly committed to the idea that each stage will be tied to a fixed time limit in the final treaty.

Nevertheless, for our part, we believe that at this juncture it is premature to devote too much time to a consideration of the time limits for each stage. In our view, the limit for each stage will have to be set in the light of the measures that we decide and agree to incorporate into that stage; and here we are thinking not only of the disarmament measures themselves, not only of the problems of demobilizing men and destroying armaments, but also of the problems both of initiating and carrying out the essential accompanying measures of control and of developing the concomitant peace-keeping machinery.

The latter two factors are among the reasons why the experience of many countries in national demobilization after World War II is not particularly relevant to our problems here with disarmament. Those countries were acting in the framework of national policy, not international agreement. There were no serious problems of control arrangements or of international commitments for peace-keeping institutions. There were not the same psychological difficulties, the ingrained thought patterns about national military establishments and the international suspicions which so complicate disarmament efforts today. The enemy had been vanquished and the animosities which still existed were of little importance because victory had been achieved.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The physical destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of armaments, we submit, is among the lesser problems of disarmament, and time limits for the stages of disarmament cannot be based primarily on these factors. I suggest as an analogy which has some relevance here the experience in the test ban negotiations. We can all agree that the actual cessation of nuclear weapon tests would itself take little or no time, but the establishment of a verification system to enforce this measure could take several years. Let me repeat what Mr. Dean said at our thirty-fifth plenary meeting:

"I must say, however, that when I hear my Soviet colleague claim that the entire world can be totally disarmed in four years I am reminded of the Soviet delegation's adamant insistence in 1960 and 1961, during the nuclear test ban Conference, that not enough of the international control system could be constructed quickly enough to permit any control operations to begin in less than four years after the entry into force of the test ban treaty."

(ENDC/PV.35, page 12)

The basic thought behind the United States plan, as I shall discuss in more detail in a moment, is to avoid increasing instability in the world by the very process of disarmament. Unrealistically short time limits could do just that. At the same time we do not doubt that over-long time limits could also be harmful, as Mr. Lall has said on several occasions, by stretching out disarmament over an unduly long period. This is why my delegation is eager and anxious to arrive at time limits which are as sound and reasonable as possible in the light of all considerations. This is also why we believe that fruitful discussion of this or that number of years can take place usefully only at a later phase of our deliberations, after we have seen in much more detail the types of measures of disarmament, control and peace-keeping which we will ultimately wish to put into each stage. We think it is premature to say this now, but it may be possible to progress more rapidly with disarmament provided that the pace of development of verification arrangements and peace-keeping measures keeps up with the pace of disarmament.

Our present estimate for stages I and II are based on the measures that we have suggested for each of those stages. These estimates are subject to modification later, if that seems called for. Moreover, we do not exclude the possibility that even after that treaty has been drafted with fixed time limits there will be the opportunity for an annual review by the international disarmament organization, to see whether future implementation could perhaps be speeded up in the light of successful past implementation.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We agree with the assumptions behind the second question posed by Mr. Edberg, that an approximately proportional reduction of armaments is more in accord with the agreed principle of balance than is a deep cut in key weapon systems. This is particularly true when some States have more of some types of weapons and other States have more of other types.

At one point in his statement yesterday, Mr. Zorin also appeared to recognize this when he said:

"I doubt whether there is a strategist who would arm the troops remaining at his disposal with, say, only tanks or only artillery. Such an army would not be equipped for either defensive or offensive action and consequently would not ensure the security of a State. In every army there will have to be a satisfactory correlation between branches of the service and categories of armaments that is satisfactory for the army concerned. We take this into account in treating reduction and destruction primarily in terms of the armaments of complete military units." (ENDC/PV.36, page 38)

The United States has in view precisely this interpretation of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles in stating that the general existing military pattern should not be disturbed while we are in the process of disarming. I should like to assure our colleague from India that this preservation of the existing pattern of military power during the process of disarming -- and not once general and complete disarmament has been achieved -- is what we mean by the use of the term "pattern". This, we believe, is not an extension of or deviation from the agreed principle of balanced reductions, but merely an attempt to spell it out in different words, in terms of what we believe is the most workable way of implementing the principle. We believe that the additional complexities of trying to negotiate composition, as well as level, of forces and armaments remaining at each stage would only delay and complicate our efforts.

The third question which Mr. Edberg raised was addressed to the Soviet delegation. We agree with its theme, that there is a significant difference between opening up all of a country and opening up a limited area. It was precisely this consideration that led the United States to propose joint exploration of the concept of progressive zonal inspection. The preliminary reply by the Soviet representative if indeed we can call it a reply -- seemed, we submit, to shed more heat than light on the matter. We still await -- as we presume, does the Swedish representative and all other representatives -- a real and reasonable Soviet response.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The fourth question, also on the zonal inspection system, was directed primarily to the United States delegation. The question evidently takes as a point of departure the suggestion that there might be initial overall declarations of the total inventories of armaments within a country without regard to zones, but that declarations by zones, and inspection of the selected zones, might be deferred for part of the first stage, until a significant cut had been effected. We have proposed that the initial declarations by zones should be made at the outset, and that inspection should proceed gradually. In the case of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, for example, under our scheme the parties would make a declaration at the beginning of the first year of the first stage. During the first part of the first year, 10 per cent of the nuclear weapon vehicles would be placed in a depot for destruction. During the second part of the first year, verification of the retained level would proceed in accordance with the zonal inspection method. This is one way that inspection might begin. We are quite prepared to discuss detailed proposals such as this one, and we ourselves will have additional suggestions to make. However, we must confess that the initial Soviet response to the general suggestion of progressive zonal inspection has been so negative that we hardly consider it fruitful to attempt at this time to negotiate details or changes in our suggestions.

Mr. Edberg's fifth question is also addressed to the establishment and operation of the zonal inspection scheme. As I have already noted, the references in the United States treaty outline to zonal inspection, found in paragraph G 3 c of stage I in our document ENDC/30, are rather general. We put this forward in the form of a suggestion. Much remains to be spelled out, and that is why we solicit from our colleagues serious and constructive comments which are directed towards enhancing the acceptability of the plan to all delegations.

The problem of how zones will be chosen for inspection is one of the issues left open. The United States language is merely the following:

"The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it."

(ENDC/30, page 14).

In these circumstances, before a careful discussion here, we do not want to rule out any method of selection, including that of drawing by lot. However, there are many other possibilities.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I should point out in this connexion that one method of applying our proposal would be to put the responsibility on each party to divide up its territory, as it thinks most equitable and desirable, into an agreed number of zones. Thus it is that, at least in the larger nations such as the United States and the Soviet Union, zones should be approximately equal from the standpoint of containing military objects. In such a situation, if a party had itself expertly divided up its own territory, there should be no reason to deny the opposite side the right to choose which zones should be inspected and in which order the zones should be inspected. In fixing the zones, each country would presumably take into account the deployment of its forces and armaments. We have no fixed ideas as to what the criteria for drawing zones might be, how large zones might be, whether they should have any particular shape, and so forth. We should like to explore all these matters a great deal further. But, assuming for the moment that it is up to the country to be inspected to divide itself up into zones, we think it follows that it should be up to the countries interested in seeing that adequate inspection takes place to take part in choosing the zone.

Let me give an example in simple terms. A farmer has two sons who are to share equally in a division of the family farm. What is the best way of making a division which will produce two areas which, while not identical, will be equal in value? Probably the most satisfactory way would be to let one of the sons divide the farm and the other son choose which part he wanted. This method can lead to very real exactitude and little ground for complaint. The zonal definition and selection system could be a parallel. However, I want to stress that these are preliminary observations; they are not at all final statements of the United States position. Our position will not be firmly fixed until we have thoroughly reviewed the problem here.

Some of the same comments apply to our Swedish colleague's sixth question as well. Nevertheless we feel we should add a few words about the problem of declarations in connexion with control measures. As Mr. Zorin said yesterday, both the Soviet and the United States disarmament programmes have provisions which call upon the parties to furnish various types of declarations at appropriate times to the international disarmament organization regarding specified facts and facets of their military establishments. It is clear, therefore, that neither side regards declarations per se as being damaging to military security, if they apply to the armed forces of a country as a whole.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The question arises, however, whether military security might be adversely affected if declarations applied not to the total armed strength of a country but only to certain geographical fractions of that strength. In other words, the Soviet Union might be willing to disclose its total strength in heavy tanks to the United States in the course of implementing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, but it might not be willing to say how many such tanks were in or around each major Soviet city or position.

The United States zonal scheme, however, does not contemplate the creation of a vast multiplicity of small zones. If it did it might well be said that a declaration about military strength within each zone would provide useful information on the deployment of armed forces and armaments. However, if the zones are fairly large in let us say, the United States and the Soviet Union, then it seems to us quite obvious that a general declaration about military strength in a zone would tell little or nothing about deployment which would be useful to any opponent for target use. The information supplied would be useful solely for later cross-checking when the particular zone was chosen for inspection.

Let me turn now to the seventh question. I have already made some comments in connexion with the fourth question, concerning when inspection might begin. The seventh question also asks where inspection would take place: whether it would take place where units or armaments were located or at special depots at which units and armaments could be concentrated. In our outline treaty we have indicated flexibility concerning this point. Permit me to call attention to paragraph 3 a of our document ENDC/30. In that paragraph it is stated that the international disarmament organization would verify reduction of armaments at "agreed depots" and reduction of armed forces "either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations". (ENDC/30, page 13)

Practical considerations would obviously have to be paramount. We would have to agree on what would be the most sensible and efficient place for verifying reduction of particular types of armaments or reduction of armed forces. The answer might vary from case to case. Clearly in cases of installations such as missile launching pads and military production facilities, as our Soviet colleague stated yesterday inspection would have to be on the spot. The same might be true in the case of inspection of airfields and the like to ensure that they were converted to exclusively civilian uses. In the case of nuclear delivery vehicles, our draft proposes destruction at selected depots under supervision by the international disarmament organization. Other armaments would be treated similarly.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I have assumed that the question related only to the verification of reductions and not to the matter of retained levels. The latter might, of course, be carried out pursuant to the zonal system under our proposal.

Turning now to the eighth question, as I have mentioned in connexion with our reply to the second question the United States delegation believes that for overall force levels it is not necessary or desirable to define precisely how the reductions would be apportioned. We say this in connexion with our plan, which as it now stands, is obviously designed to deal in the first instance with problems concerning disarmament of the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. For these forces, and in most cases, despite differences in systems of conscription, it does not seem necessary, at least with our present knowledge, to distinguish between career personnel and conscripts performing their required full-time active duty. We recognize that the problem may be of more concern to some other States, for example those with neighbours which have Forces very differently composed, and we believe such problems should be faced at an appropriate time. But it is our belief that as far as the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned it is not necessary to complicate our task by introducing the question of precisely how the reductions would be apportioned. We would welcome, however, any proposals by States which are particularly concerned with this problem.

The ninth question is posed to both the Soviet and the United States delegations. We shall try to reply directly and constructively. Quite frankly, there is a problem in determining the best means to apply a zonal inspection approach to overseas bases. We see several possible solutions to this problem, and we would welcome constructive suggestions from others, as well as discussion of these possibilities. In most cases, we believe, it should be possible to consider such bases as part of the defence arrangements of the country in which they are located under mutual defence agreements, and subject, therefore to zonal arrangements for inspection within the host State. In some other cases, for example where the host country did not initially adhere to the disarmament agreement, that State might none the less be willing to negotiate access arrangements with the international disarmament organization to permit inspection of the base in question. We would certainly urge any country in whose defence we were obligated to assist to do so. Finally, in certain cases it might be possible to assimilate overseas or non-territorial bases to certain zones in the home country and arrange for their inspection through access agreement between the host country and the international disarmament organization.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The tenth question concerned the definition of nuclear weapons carriers or, as clarified at our last meeting, delivery vehicles. We believe that it is important to define this category in terms of types of weapons in order to be as precise as possible in meeting the principle of balanced reductions. As will be recalled, the United States draft treaty outline lists categories of vehicles and specific types within such categories. Mr. Zorin stated yesterday that this problem was:

"... solve itself since, under our draft treaty, States must submit information about the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles before a start is made on the implementation of the first age measures.

This information will of course include data on the weight and other characteristics of the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, so that in our opinion, no difficulties should arise in this matter". (ENDC/PV.36 page 40) It appears that Mr. Zorin does not intend to provide such information until after the treaty is signed. We would respectfully submit that, without declaring now the numbers of vehicles in each category, nor their location, the Soviet delegation should be willing to specify now the categories and types within categories, as they are specified in the United States draft outline.

Turning to the more specific problem of potential nuclear weapons delivery systems, we are unable to agree with our Soviet colleague when he dismisses lightly the possibility of converting aircraft or ships not designed to deliver nuclear weapons into nuclear delivery systems. To be sure, there is a difference between efficient and inefficient means of delivery of nuclear weapons to targets, but it is not "obviously unthinkable", as the representative of a Power possessing sophisticated nuclear weapons should know.

What is the solution to this problem? We cannot destroy all aircraft and ships. What we can do, and what the United States plan in fact does, is to provide for the gradual phasing down, at the same time, during all three stages, of military vehicles designed for delivery of nuclear weapons; of other military vehicles capable of carrying such weapons, whether or not so designed; and of nuclear weapon stocks. The United States plan does not permit an alleged 100 per cent cut of weapon vehicles while nuclear weapons are still being produced without restriction or limitation, as is the case under the Soviet plan. The United States plan does not permit a situation in which these ever-growing nuclear stockpiles could be used by a potential aggressor whose society featured secrecy, under which clandestine conversion of fleets of civil aircraft and ships into nuclear weapon delivery vehicles could take place. We believe that the United

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

States plan gives the most reasonable assurances by reducing, through steady, progressive stages, both delivery means and the destructive means to be delivered.

The eleventh question of the Swedish representative was addressed exclusively to the representative of the Soviet Union, and we note that other voices have been added to ours in seeking clarification of this important question, which the Soviet representatives, we submit did not even pretend to answer in his preliminary reply yesterday. The question was: Does the Soviet Government agree to complete inspection of the USSR to verify that all nuclear delivery vehicles are destroyed and that none is being produced clandestinely?

Finally, in regard to the twelfth and last question posed by Mr. Edberg, we should like to recall the proposal in the first stage of our draft treaty outline to find the most rapid ways possible to prohibit, and verify the prohibition, of chemical and biological weapons. Of course, as Mr. Edberg brought out, very difficult problems are connected with verifying the elimination of stockpiles and the cessation of the production of chemical, and especially biological and bacterial, weapons. The United States has therefore called for an examination of this problem in the first stage. In an effort to advance our work still more rapidly we declare our readiness to participate in an expert study group even prior to stage I. We are, in fact, prepared to begin at any time in order to determine whether measures sufficiently effective and workable can be devised in time to be implemented in stage I.

In conclusion, we would like to say that we very much appreciate the initiative of our Swedish colleague in raising those questions, which we believe help to clarify issues and to advance our work. We believe that these questions constructively sharpen our understanding and we hope that they will help to bring us all closer to agreement.

Mr. LALL (India): We have just listened to a very interest statement by the representative of the United States with reference to the questions which were asked a few days ago by the representative of Sweden. I shall not comment today on that matter, but should like to turn to the question of outer space which was raised yesterday by the representative of the United States.

I should like to make a few remarks regarding the background of this issue. It is an important background, very much relevant to the work of this Conference. As a result of technological advance in space research, it is evident now that outer space may be used not only for peaceful but for warlike purposes. Space

(Mr. Lall, India)

research has now moved beyond the exploratory stage into the phase of military exploitation, and the conqueror of space can now become the conqueror of more than just our own world.

It seems to us that there is a complex of problems directly connected with the security of all nations and man's ability to send vehicles into outer space, which forms a critical background for the consideration of many other issues. For example, ICBMs sometimes reach a height of 600 miles above the earth. It appears too that a time might come when advances in space technology would permit satellites with nuclear warheads to be launched secretly and to be maintained on distant orbits until recalled for use against targets on earth. They might also be used to jam attack-warning systems and to provide weather and other observations to facilitate military movements on earth. This crucial aspect of the problem, namely the control of such non-peaceful uses of outer space, is essentially part of the problem of world peace -- that is, disarmament.

Since the first submission of a proposal by the United States in January 1957 in the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/C.1/783), this whole problem has been considered in some of its various details. There has already been some meeting of minds of the two sides on this question. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have stressed the need for international co-operation in the study and exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes. Both States have seemed to agree that the penetration into outer space is a concern of all mankind and that the United Nations should accordingly be vested with a certain competence in this matter. At one stage, in order to bridge what appeared to be a certain gulf between the two points of view on some matters, a joint draft resolution was proposed in the General Assembly on 24 November 1958 by Burma, the United Arab Republic and India (A/C.1/L.224/Rev.1). The resolution asked that consideration be given to the urgent need for constructive work in the peaceful uses of outer space. It further asked the Soviet Union and the United States to study this matter and report to the First Committee of the General Assembly on an agreed approach to the problem.

At that time, the delegation of India pointed out that the two draft resolutions submitted by the United States and other countries (A/C.1/L.220/Rev.1) and by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.219/Rev.1) were not designed to ensure that outer space would be used solely for peaceful purposes. At the 994th meeting of the First Committee we observed:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"It was not outer space which threatened mankind, but the objects that could be sent through outer space, namely, weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the Soviet Union had both avoided that question. Nevertheless, that was the question which must be settled ..." (A/C.1/SR.994, para. 33)

We always felt that agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States was essential for progress in this question. In this connexion, we would like to recall the Antarctica treaty of 1 December 1959, which has been signed by twelve nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union. I would like to say in parenthesis that Mr. Stelle referred to the Antarctica Treaty. I would like to recall at this juncture that the question of Antarctica and its peaceful uses was first mooted by the Indian delegation in the United Nations, but we did not press for a decision there because certain countries closely concerned thought that the matter ought to be dealt with differently. We were very glad indeed when the idea which we had formulated was taken up by other States. Article 1 of the Antarctica treaty lays down that Antarctica should be used for peaceful purposes only and that any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of any military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons, should be prohibited. It is this sort of treaty that India thought should be concluded in the United Nations in the field of outer space.

Our delegation is happy to note that the Soviet Union and the United States are co-operating in the United Nations Committee on Outer Space, and we welcome the meetings of the Technical and Legal Sub-Committees arranged to take place at Geneva on 28 May. We hope that further progress will be made in these Committees which will prove of assistance in our endeavours for disarmament.

We are also very glad to note that both the United States and the Soviet Union have refrained from asserting the principle of national sovereignty in outer space. There has been a series of statements by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State of the United States which reflect a point of view comparable to the United States position on claims to sovereignty in Antarctica. Then again, Professor Korevin of the Soviet Union, writing in January 1959, observed that the Paris, Chicago and related Conventions were inapplicable to cosmic space, that national law did not extend that far, and that analogies drawn from sea or air law were not pertinent. Rejecting the concept of national sovereignty in cosmic space as "unscientific geocentrism, a return from Copernicus to Ptolemy", he also

(Mr. Lall, India)

rejected complete freedom since anti-social acts equivalent to piracy would have to be barred. It is clear, therefore, that there is a hopeful background to this issue concerning disarmament in outer space.

Now, coming to the two plans, first I would say we are glad to note that the measures for outer space are placed in stage I in both plans. In this connexion may I draw attention to this part of Mr. Stelle's statement yesterday:

"In this area our timely achievement of agreement could preclude the creation of serious military imbalance." (ENDC/PV.36, page 12)

We agree with that view fully, and we strongly support the maintenance of these measures in stage I of our plan for disarmament.

Turning to the measures themselves, we are glad to see a wide area of agreement between the two plans. If I may say so -- and as I will try to show in a few moments -- I think the area of agreement is slightly wider even than was indicated yesterday by the representative of the United States.

Let me now take up these plans. I will begin with the United States plan, which is in some respects a little more detailed than the Soviet plan, and I will refer to the Soviet plan alongside my references to the United States plan. First, there is the question of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. Of course we all agree with that; it arises directly out of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). But I suggest for consideration that the word "mass" need not be included. I know it is included in the Joint Principles, but would it not be wiser just to say the prohibition of all weapons in orbit? I do not see the need to restrict ourselves to weapons of mass destruction, although of course that is what is mainly in our minds when we talk of this matter. Both plans speak of weapons of mass destruction. Our suggestion would be that they should cover the delivering of all weapons from outer space.

The next thought in those plans is that the parties to the treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction. Again subject to my comment on the word "mass", we favour this idea, which appears on both sides.

The next idea in the United States plan is that there should be increased international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. It might be said that this is not directly a disarmament matter, but we think it is closely connected with disarmament and we would be happy to see such an idea included in the disarmament plan as an ancillary to the actual disarmament measures in this particular part of our proposed treaty.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Now we come to notification and pre-launch inspection. We agree, of course, that there should be notification and pre-launch inspection, but I must frankly say I was a little puzzled by the statement made by Mr. Stelle that the Soviet draft does not provide for pre-launch inspection or for advance notification. It seems to us -- and I just draw attention to this matter so as to facilitate agreement on it -- that paragraph 2 of article 15 of the Soviet draft says clearly that the international disarmament organization, through arrangements which would be made, would thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching. That seems clearly to be pre-launch inspection and in that phrase is implied pre-launch notification; otherwise, of course, there could not be pre-launch inspection. So we think the sense is covered in both drafts, and we welcome and support this.

There is another point in the United States draft, namely, that there would also be notification of the track of the space vehicle or missile. I suppose that is desirable, although I am not competent to say one way or the other.

Now I come to the last point which has been raised. It is in the United States draft and relates to limitation on production and on related activities. The idea behind this may be all right, but we do not particularly like the way it has been expressed. What seems to us important is not that there should be agreed limitations but that there should be perhaps co-ordinated planning, co-ordinated ideas, on this matter. Limitation sounds as though there was going to be a restriction on even peaceful development in outer space in this field. That would seem to me to be inappropriate. It seems to me that this links up really with another idea in the United States draft, namely that there should be co-operation in the field of outer space. I think that co-operation exchanges regarding plans for developing boosters for space vehicles for peaceful purposes might be discussed, but we do not particularly like the idea of limitations. I would like the other members of the Committee to bear with me if I say that this might result in keeping certain countries out of the field of space research and exploration and building their own boosters -- and that, of course, for peaceful purposes, we would not favour. I would say that this is a question which should be looked at through the avenue of co-operation in outer space measures, and the formulation in the United States draft appears not to be necessary.

(Mr. Lall, India)

In conclusion I would again say that the two plans are very close together, and we hope that our brief comments will help to bridge remaining differences and that it will be easy for the co-Chairmen to work out a joint draft on this important part of our first stage for disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to deal with certain questions which were touched upon at previous meetings. During the discussion of the question of time limits for the implementation of the stages and the whole programme of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that the United States proposal contains such conditions for the transition from one stage to another as would enable any of the permanent members of the control council or Security Council to stop the disarmament process. The practical consequence of this might be that disarmament would not go beyond the first stage. A treaty in which such hurdles are placed in the way of the implementation of the whole disarmament plan can hardly be called a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That is the inescapable conclusion to which everyone will come after making a careful study of the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Today's statement by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, on the question of time-limits, merely confirms our conclusion, because he himself has said that, as a matter of fact, in setting the time-limits much will depend not only on how disarmament measures can be implemented physically but also on how quickly the accompanying measures of control will be carried out and concomitant peace-keeping machinery developed. This circumstance alone makes us think of serious obstacles to the transition from stage I to stage II and from stage II to stage III in the disarmament process. But, besides that, the transition mechanism itself makes for serious obstacles, about which I have more to say.

In his statement on 11 May, Mr. Dean tried to call our conclusion in question. He urged members of the Committee:

"... not to take too literally, without careful examination of the facts involved, the assertions which Mr. Zorin has been making with regard to the provisions for transition from stage to stage in the United States draft treaty outline." (ENDC/PV.35, page 13)

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

However, Mr. Dean immediately afterwards confirmed our conclusion that the United States draft treaty gives the permanent members of the control council and Security Council a right of veto over the implementation of disarmament. Moreover, he tried to depict this as a necessity and as recognizing "the current facts of international life". However, apparently realizing the flimsiness of these assertions, he made an attempt to interpret the Soviet Union's proposals arbitrarily and ascribed to us a similar desire to secure for ourselves a right of veto over transition from one stage of disarmament to another.

When Mr. Dean referred to the need for a veto over transition from one stage to another, if one recognizes the current facts of life, he put forward the idea that the veto is necessary in order to create confidence between States. In our view, however, such a train of argument is absolutely erroneous. In fact, how can one expect States to have confidence in a treaty which does not contain firm obligations to implement disarmament within strict time-limits, and how can one expect to create confidence between States, when it is known beforehand that they can interrupt the disarmament process at any time? In this connexion, the opposition shown on the part of the United States delegation to the establishment of an overall time limit for the disarmament programme becomes understandable. This opposition is no mere coincidence, because it is connected with the United States delegation's general concept of transition from one stage to another and with its general approach to this question.

The United States representative distorted our proposals by putting an arbitrary interpretation on articles 40 and 42 of our draft treaty. Mr. Dean's arguments themselves are remarkable. In estimating the approximate composition of the control council, he inferred a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to ensure the right of veto because, if the socialist States and Western Powers had equal representation, the Soviet Union would have to enlist the vote or abstention of only one non-aligned member to obtain the decision it desired. But what is wrong with that, Mr. Dean? We shall have to prove the correctness of our position, and if we obtain a majority in the control council, it will mean that our position is correct and corresponds to the interests of most of the members of the control council or control organization. You see a danger in this, but by saying so you betray a lack of confidence in the validity and correctness of your position. But we have no such fears and put our faith in a procedure, where the determining factor is not an automatic majority but the convincingness

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

of the position which meets the interests of the overall cause of disarmament. The representative of India, Mr. Lall, was quite right when he pointed out that a two-thirds majority in the international disarmament organization would give sufficient assurance that there would be no incautious or blind decisions. In depicting in a false light the Soviet Union's position, Mr. Dean confused two essentially different questions, because the memorandum of the Soviet Government, which we submitted at the same time as the draft treaty, sets out quite clearly and precisely our approach to the method of work of the international disarmament organization and to the execution of enforcement or preventive measures. I should like to read out the relevant part of this memorandum, which is an official document of our Conference:

"In considering the functions, powers, and method of work of the International Disarmament Organization, the Soviet Government came to the conclusion that there is no need to introduce into it the unanimity principle or the veto, and that it could be agreed that decisions would be taken by an appropriate majority. In this connexion the Soviet Government took due account of the nature of the tasks of the International Disarmament Organization, namely, to verify compliance by States with their Treaty obligations, to note the completion of the measures included in a particular stage, and to submit relevant reports to the States, and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

"It goes without saying that the International Disarmament Organization will not and cannot be entrusted with any functions involving the execution of preventive or enforcement measures in regard to States. The business of the International Disarmament Organization is to establish facts. If in connexion with those facts the need should arise of taking action to safeguard peace and security, this would, as heretofore, be exclusively within the competence of the Security Council which is the sole body empowered to take such action by the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/3 pages 7 and 8)

That is the exact text in the Soviet Government memorandum, which was circulated to all members of our Committee, including the United States delegation.

Consequently, when we are concerned with the activities of the international disarmament organization, including the question of transition from one stage of disarmament to another, we do not envisage any veto, and there is no need to confuse this issue. Our position is perfectly clear. That is why we have

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

already stated quite clearly in the first part, in the first chapter of our draft treaty, that the transition from one stage to another shall be decided by the international disarmament organization and not by the Security Council. The question of the veto arises only when it is necessary to apply sanctions against a State creating a threat to the cause of peace. It is known that the prerogative of applying diplomatic, economic or military sanctions belongs exclusively to the Security Council, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, and the Soviet Government considers it essential to comply with these provisions of the Charter. The provision that enforcement measures may and should be carried out by the Security Council and not by the international disarmament organization, safeguards all parties to the treaty from the possibility of abuses of any kind from any quarter. That is the position of the Soviet Government.

Therefore, the answers to the questions which have been put in this connexion are perfectly clear. Our position differs from that of the United States. In our plan, transition from one stage to another is to be decided by the international disarmament organization by a normal qualified majority of votes, and nothing more. The question of adopting preventive or enforcement measures is to be decided by the Security Council, as is the case at the present time. That is our position. The United States' position is different. The transition from one stage to another is to be decided not only by the international disarmament organization but by the Security Council, that is to say, any member of the Security Council may veto the transition from one stage to another. These are obviously different positions. But we believe that in the interests of the implementation of the whole disarmament programme, our position should be adopted because it is better adapted to ensure an uninterrupted process of disarmament. Otherwise, there is, in fact, no guarantee that disarmament will be carried out from beginning to end.

In the course of the discussions, we have already drawn attention to the fact that at one time and for quite a lengthy period we were accused of using the right of veto, but this accusation was levelled at us at a time when the Soviet Union was using the right of veto in connexion with certain enforcement measures or measures connected with the prevention of certain moves which might have been directed against particular States. We have been accused here of using the right

(Mr. Zorin. USSR)

of veto. And now the United States wishes to use this right of veto, but for an entirely different purpose: for the purpose of putting a possible stop to the process of disarmament.

You yourselves realize that these are entirely different positions and entirely different approaches to the use of the right of veto.

I will now dwell on another question, which was touched upon by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti. First of all, I note with satisfaction that Mr. Cavalletti, as far as I can judge from his statement of 14 May (ENDC/PV.36), has apparently realized the inevitability of the liquidation of military blocs and alliances in the process of disarmament. He seems to have been led to this conclusion by understanding the logic of events in connexion with the implementation of general and complete disarmament. It only remains for me to express the hope that Mr. Cavalletti will go further and recognize the necessity of liquidating foreign bases in the first stage as a prelude to the liquidation of military alliances.

Having become an opponent of military alliances, Mr. Cavalletti saw some sort of contradiction in our position and tried to draw the conclusion that our draft treaty provided for the maintenance of military alliances. Our point of view has been explained very clearly already, and I do not think there is any need to put Mr. Cavalletti's mind at rest on this score. We were, and still are, opponents of military alliances. In our draft treaty, including paragraph 4 of article 2, to which Mr. Cavalletti referred, there is no mention of setting up an international disarmament organization and recruiting its staff on the principle of blocs. We mention the groups of States existing in the world at the present time, and that is all. Whether we like it or not, such groups do exist. Mr. Cavalletti, and certain others whom he did not mention by name, do not wish to admit the existence of three groups of States - but it is odd to hear this in our Committee, the actual composition of which testifies very clearly to the fact that such groups do, in fact, exist. We cannot conduct serious negotiations on disarmament and we shall not be able to reach agreement if we close our eyes to real facts. It is for this reason that we propose in our draft treaty a balanced and equitable membership of the international disarmament organization and its subordinate bodies, which would reflect the situation in the world as it is today.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Mr. Cavalletti asked how our position could be reconciled with the situation that would arise after general and complete disarmament. It seems to me that the answer to this question arises out of the very nature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The purpose of the treaty is to disarm all States, but not to alter their internal structure, their political systems or their convictions. Consequently, the differences between States will remain not only after the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament but also after its implementation. Their military situations will be changed; they will no longer have armaments at their disposal. They will no longer have to fear aggression from outside. Naturally, the relations between States will also change. They will be based on permanent co-operation and not on a struggle between blocs. That is how we envisage the course of events.

In this connexion, I should like to associate myself with the remarks made by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, who had some justified doubts with regard to the concept introduced in the United States proposals of preserving in the process of disarmament the existing military pattern of States and as between States. The representative of India is right when he draws the conclusion that such a concept is very dangerous, since it is contrary to the idea of general and complete disarmament and is basically aimed at preserving the military power of States and weapons of mass destruction. Incidentally, it was precisely the desire to stress the difference between what we have at the present time and what we shall have at our disposal on the completion of general and complete disarmament, which prompted us to lay down in our draft treaty that by the end of general and complete disarmament States may have only militia or police. The difference between modern armed forces and militia (or police) is so evident not only as regards their arms but also as regards their tasks, that I see no need to go into this subject any further.

However, our Western partners in the negotiations steadfastly adhere to a different position. As a matter of fact, they wish to retain armed forces, moreover, such armed forces as could be equipped with the most terrible weapons, including nuclear weapons, in order to carry out, as they say, noble tasks of an international character. We consider such a concept to be absolutely unacceptable. That is why we object to this both in the draft treaty and in the negotiations which we are now conducting with the representative of the United States.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I consider it necessary to explain the position of the Soviet Union on questions relating to the use of outer space. First, I must refer briefly to a matter of history since in the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, at yesterday's meeting there were some inaccuracies. I shall not go into the subject of who took the initiative in raising the question of the need for international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space. Mr. Stelle referred to the United States proposal submitted at the eleventh session of the General Assembly (First Committee, 821st meeting). I shall not make any comments on this proposal; I shall read out an extract from it, so that the members of the Committee can judge what the United States was proposing -- co-operation for the peaceful uses of outer space or the establishment of international control without disarmament. The last two sentences of point 11 of the United States memorandum of 12 January 1957, which contains the quintessence of its proposal, states that:

"The United States proposes that the first step toward the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes would be to bring the testing of such objects under international inspection and participation. In this matter, as in other matters, the United States is ready to participate in fair, balanced, reliable systems of control." (A/C.1/783)

In a number of subsequent documents, including President Eisenhower's messages to which Mr. Stelle referred, the same line was followed with the aim of establishing control over missiles, without any concrete proposals concerning the prohibition and elimination of this type of weapons or disarmament as such. Apparently the United States delegation has been unable to get away from such an approach even up to the present day.

The question of the use of outer space was put in its right perspective by the well-known proposal of the Soviet Government for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign bases in alien territories, and international co-operation in the field of outer space exploration. This proposal was submitted by our government to the United Nations on 15 March 1958 (A/3818).

The question concerning outer space has two aspects - a military and a peaceful aspect. The question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes, as will be clear to all, does not admit of a practical solution

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

in isolation from a radical solution of the disarmament problem. In the circumstances where nuclear weapons are retained and foreign military bases remain in alien territories and there is consequently the threat of a nuclear blow being struck, it is impossible to consider in a practical way the question of establishing any kind of control over rockets. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government has shown its readiness to carry out international co-operation for the peaceful use of outer space. In its proposal of 15 March 1958 it emphasized that such co-operation.

"... can be greatly expanded and extended to many other fields of human activity if agreement is reached on a radical solution of the disarmament problem, including a complete ban on the atomic and hydrogen weapons, the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories, and the like." (ibid., page 4)

In order to secure this peaceful co-operation the Soviet Government proposed on 15 March 1958 the conclusion of an international agreement which would include the following basic provisions:

"1. A ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes and an undertaking by States to launch rockets into cosmic space only under an agreed international programme.

2. The elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other States, primarily in Europe, the Near and Middle East and North Africa.

3. The establishment within the framework of the United Nations of appropriate international control over the implementation of the obligations set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. The establishment of a United Nations agency for international co-operation in the study of cosmic space ..." (ibid., page 7)

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's proposal to prohibit the use of outer space for military purposes did not meet with a favourable response on the part of the United States and other Western Powers. This question has remained unsolved in practice up to today.

As regards the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment of a United Nations body for international co-operation in the field of outer space exploration, its implementation has met with considerable difficulties. I could tell the members of the Committee a great deal about the attempts of the United States to secure for the Western Powers a dominating position in the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The United States tried, on the one hand, to ensure that the States connected with the United States in military blocs should have a majority of votes and, on the other, it stubbornly opposed the idea that

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

decisions in the Committee should be taken by agreement, as we have arranged to do here. It was only as a result of lengthy negotiations and great efforts on our part that we finally succeeded, and then only in March of this year at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, in reaching agreement on the adoption of the only possible and workable principle, namely, to take decisions on the basis of agreement. We are gratified that the United Nations Committee on Outer Space has now begun its work. The Soviet Union, whose achievements in the field of the peaceful exploration of outer space are well known, is doing everything possible to contribute to the development of international co-operation in this field. "The Soviet Government has always regarded, as it does now, the successes of our country in space exploration not only as the achievements of the Soviet people but as the achievements of all humanity" - these words from the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Krushchev, to President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, of 20 March 1962 express the substance and orientation of our policy in this matter.

In this message, the Head of the Soviet Government proposed a broad programme for uniting the efforts of States in the peaceful exploration of outer space. It includes the use of artificial satellites of the earth, the creation of an international system of long-range communication, the organization of a world meteorological service with the aid of artificial satellites of the earth, the organization, in accordance with a joint programme, of the observation of objects launched towards the moon, Mars, Venus, and further into the solar system; joint study of the physics of inter-planetary space and celestial bodies, and assistance in searching for and rescuing space vehicles that have crashed, co-operation in compiling charts of the earth's magnetic field with the aid of satellites; the exchange of knowledge in the field of space medicine, and the determination of a common approach to the solution of important legal problems.

The Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate as fully as possible with other States in the peaceful exploration of outer space. But we cannot forget that the question of outer space is closely connected with terrestrial matters. Precisely for this reason, Mr. Khrushchev stressed in his message to President Kennedy:

"At the same time it seems obvious to me that the scope of our co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space, as well as the choice of the actual directions in which such co-operation will be possible, depend to some extent on the solution of the disarmament problem. Until agreement on general and complete

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

disarmament is reached, our two countries will still be limited in their possibilities of co-operating in the field of the peaceful use of outer space. It is no secret that military rockets and space vehicles launched for peaceful purposes are based on the common achievements of science and technology. True, there already exist some differences here as well: space rockets require more powerful propulsion devices as they have to lift bigger loads to greater heights, whereas military rockets do not, in general, require such powerful boosters - the propulsion devices already in existence are capable of lifting warheads of great destructive power and delivering them to any part of the globe. But you, Mr. President, know as well as we do that the principles of design and production are the same for military rockets and for outer-space rockets".

This quotation from the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Krushchev, to the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, regarding the common features shared by space vehicles for peaceful purposes and military rockets points to the lever with the aid of which we should solve the problem of the prohibition of the military use of outer space. Control over rockets without eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and without solving the basic problems of general and complete disarmament is impossible. It is precisely for this reason that we propose in the first stage of disarmament to prohibit and destroy all means of delivery of nuclear weapons and to retain only the production of rockets required for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. It is impossible to solve this problem by reducing the means of delivery of nuclear weapons on a percentage basis, as proposed by the United States, because such a percentage reduction together with simultaneous control over these means of delivery would necessarily put any country which has certain advantages in the field of rocket production in a very disadvantageous position. No such country, of course, could agree to this. We have already said enough about this in the past and therefore I shall not dwell on this point any longer.

I am bound to say that we are amazed at the stubborn attempts of the United States delegation either not to see what has been laid down in the Soviet proposals or to interpret them in its own way. We encountered this when we discussed the question of the reduction of conventional armaments and force levels and we explained our position. We met with the same approach, unfortunately, in Mr. Stelle's statement at the last meeting. He asserted that the Soviet proposal would not require advance notification of missile launchings, as would the United States

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

proposal, and that the Soviet draft does not provide for pre-launch inspection of missiles, and does not provide for measures concerning the production and verification of boosters for space vehicles.

I shall not enter into a difficult debate, but I shall draw your attention to specific paragraphs of the Soviet draft treaty, to which, in particular, the representative of India who spoke before me also drew attention.

Paragraph 2 of article 14 of our draft reads:

"The State parties to the Treaty shall provide advance information to the International Disarmament Organization about all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes ..." (ENDC/2, page 12)

So you see that our draft treaty, in spite of the assertions of the United States representative, does provide for advance information to be given to the international disarmament organization about all - I stress "all" - launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes.

Paragraph 2 of article 15 provides that the international disarmament organization shall exercise control over the launchings of rockets and space devices for peaceful purposes, and I quote:

"... Through the establishment of inspection teams at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings who shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before their launching". (ibid)

In my opinion, this is written quite clearly; the inspection teams of the international disarmament organization or, in other words, the controllers, will be present at the launching sites of rockets intended for peaceful purposes. They will not only observe the launching of these rockets, but will thoroughly examine every rocket and every satellite before their launching.

I also do not understand on what the United States representative was basing himself when he asserted that the Soviet Union does not provide for any measures of control over the production of boosters, as they are known in the United States, for space vehicles. In this connexion I must draw your attention to article 5 of our draft treaty. Paragraph 2 of this article contains a very clear provision for the discontinuance of production of all types of rockets and pilotless aircraft. Everything that has been used for the production, testing and storing of this type of weapon will be liquidated. There will remain the possibility of producing only one type of rocket, namely rockets for the peaceful use of space. This, of course, includes space rockets and boosters for them. It may be asked how this production will be carried out. I shall read out paragraph 4 of article 5 of our draft treaty:

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"For the peaceful exploration of space the production and testing of appropriate rockets shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization" (ENDC/2, page 6).

Perhaps the representative of the United States will understand more clearly, if I especially draw his attention to the words "appropriate rockets". In Russian it means rockets which are intended for definite purposes, in this specific case, for the exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes, and this, of course, includes all rockets as well as boosters for large space rockets and vehicles.

So as to leave no doubts about the position of the Soviet Union on questions of outer space, I think I should sum it up briefly. This position is simple and logical. In the first stage of disarmament all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, including military rockets, are to be eliminated and destroyed. These measures, by removing the danger of a nuclear attack by one State against another, will create a solid basis for establishing control over the production of rockets for the peaceful use of outer space. The production of these rockets, their use and the placing in orbit for various satellites for the launching of space vehicles and so forth, will be carried out under international control. The international organization will be informed in advance about the launching of these devices and its inspectors will be able to satisfy themselves that the launching is carried out in full conformity with the announced programme and that the rocket carries nothing except the necessary scientific instruments.

That is the gist of our proposal concerning questions of outer space. But, as you see, it is closely connected with a basic measure of the first stage, with the complete elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Without that, it is impossible to solve the question of control over all rockets, because no State possessing such powerful devices as rockets would agree to it. It is linked with the whole programme of the first stage of disarmament which is set out in our draft treaty. You know that in the first stage the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons is linked with the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories, with the withdrawal of foreign troops and with a corresponding drastic reduction of conventional arms and force levels.

The whole programme is co-ordinated, each measure is co-ordinated, and there is a serious internal logic in this co-ordination. That is why questions of outer space are also linked with this disarmament programme as a whole.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

As to the peaceful exploration of space and co-operation in this field, as I have already said today, and as is evident from the decisions taken recently by the Committee on Outer Space in New York, we have drawn up a definite programme of co-operation in this field, and two Sub-Committees, which will meet in Geneva at the end of this month, namely, the Technical Sub-Committee and the Legal Sub-Committee, will make a thorough study of these questions.

I think that, in light of this, our position both on the question of peaceful collaboration in the field of the exploration of outer space and on the question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes is perfectly clear.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): The United States delegation will study with great care the very helpful remarks made this morning by the representative of India as well as the statement made by the Soviet representative with regard to outer space. If in our study of these statements it should prove to be the case that in our earlier statement we indicated certain differences between the Soviet plan and the United States plan which do not in fact exist, the United States delegation will be more than happy to confess error. We are not completely convinced that this is the case and obviously we will want to give this question very close study.

With respect to the remarks made by Mr. Zorin on the question of transition, we will of course give these remarks also the closest study. I must say that in listening to Mr. Zorin I was unable to see that he had in any respect effectively disputed the interpretation of the Soviet plan which Mr. Dean set forth at our thirty-fifth meeting. Mr. Zorin reminded us that under the Soviet plan decisions with respect to transition will be made by the international disarmament organization. We have assumed that in view of the general scope and range of the functions laid upon the control council in the Soviet draft this would mean that the control council would be charged with this function. Indeed, in the Soviet draft the control council is specifically charged with examining the results of the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament, as will be seen from sub-paragraph (d), paragraph 2 of article 42 (ENDC/2, page 27).

As was pointed out by Mr. Dean, under the Soviet draft, paragraph 3 of article 42 (ibid.) the decisions of the control council on procedural matters shall be taken

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority. We would assume that the Soviet Union would not hold that an important question such as transition from one stage to another was a procedural matter. I think it fair to state that we would hardly agree with such an interpretation. Therefore, we must look at the composition of the control council and what effect this would have with a two-thirds vote under the Soviet plan. And we find the statement in subparagraph (b), paragraph 1 of article 42, that the composition of the council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world. We know what that means in Soviet interpretation.

Mr. Dean pointed out that the Soviet Union has not specified or suggested in its plan the number of members that should make up the control council. Mr. Dean also pointed out that if the membership of the control council were, say, eleven, as was suggested and in fact agreed to for the test ban control system during the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty, a two-thirds vote would require something over seven, mathematically seven and a third. If, therefore, the Soviet bloc had four seats on the control council, the Western alliance had four seats and the other three seats were allotted to non-aligned Powers, the Soviet bloc, by having four out of eleven, would have enough votes to block a two-thirds vote. A two-thirds vote would require seven and a third, or eight, votes. If, on the other hand, the control council were made up of three groups of equal numbers under the Soviet scheme, the Soviet bloc would start with one-third of the votes and would need to enlist only the affirmative vote or the abstention of one other member of the control council in order to be able to block a decision on transition. Therefore, we maintain that Mr. Dean's analysis was completely correct.

Mr. Zorin referred to persuading the majority. But under the Soviet plan it is a two-thirds majority, with the Soviet bloc starting out with one-third, or slightly more than one-third.

Mr. Zorin did not refer at all, as I heard him, to the further point which Mr. Dean made in reference to article 40 of the Soviet draft treaty, which provides: "All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security, which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present treaty, including" -- this does not mean exclusively -- "preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/2, page 25)

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Mr. Dean raised the question whether we could have any doubt that:

"if the Soviet Union felt at the end of any stage that the United States, for example, had not properly carried out its treaty obligations, the Soviet Union would say that transition raised a question affecting international security and, therefore, that the entire issue had to be put to the Security Council ..." (ENDC/PV.35, page 14)

Mr. Dean went on to say that in the Security Council, "as we all know, the Soviet Union has a veto and, indeed, has used this veto some hundred times." (ibid.)

As I have said, my delegation will study with great care the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union. But at first hearing it does not seem to us that he has in any way controverted the interpretation which was put forward by the United States delegation on this point.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

What the United States representative has just said greatly surprises me and, I think, not me alone, because I have dealt in great detail today with the question of a two-thirds majority and article 40. I quoted the memorandum of the Soviet Government where it is clearly stated that we shall report to the Security Council only if there is a real threat to peace and if it is a question of applying preventive and enforcement measures. I do not quite understand why the United States representative considers that I have not refuted the arguments which were put forward by Mr. Dean at a previous meeting and which I criticized.

It remains a fact that we are not demanding the right of veto over transition from one stage to another. That is a fact. And it remains a fact that the United States is demanding the right of veto. Those are two real facts. It is impossible to get away from them. But all the arguments concerning a two-thirds majority and what combination of votes may lead to this or that decision have the same fallacious basis. On this basis, no decisions can be reached in any organ, if you are going to calculate each time what a two-thirds majority means for this or that combination. But here we have the democratic rule of decision by majority. Are you then denying the rule of decision by majority? Such a rule exists in parliaments and other places -- even in the General Assembly there is the two-thirds majority rule. There, too, you can calculate how many votes are necessary to give a majority to the United States or to the Soviet Union. Incidentally, you did not make such calculations ten years ago because you were sure that you would always have a two-thirds majority. Now you are making calculations because the

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

ratio of votes is different. Why? Because the world has changed. What can be done about it? There is nothing we can do to help you in this matter. There is a realistic provision: a two-thirds majority -- this is a qualified majority. Do you not wish to take this qualified majority into consideration? Or do you?

It is just as we say: you now do not want to take this qualified majority in consideration, but want to have only the right of veto. For what question? For the question of whether or not to pass on to the next stage. That is the crux of the matter. But we say that once we have signed a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we are prepared to pass from one stage to the next on the basis of a decision adopted by a qualified majority. We are not demanding the right of veto for ourselves -- for any country. But you are demanding it. That is the difference in our positions.

Hence we can draw a certain conclusion and I think we are not alone in drawing it. You want to ensure for yourselves, without any competition for votes, the possibility of saying at some moment that you do not want to pass on to stage II. By your vote alone you would stop the whole disarmament process. That is the point. We consider this to be wrong and not in keeping with the interests of the matter, with the interests of disarmament itself. This is a dangerous situation, because if we sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament including measures of such great importance for the interests of States as the elimination of the means of delivery, the dismantling of bases, a radical reduction of armed forces, the elimination of nuclear weapons and so forth, and if we have no guarantee that the disarmament process will go on without interruption, will any State have confidence in such a treaty?

I think this is perfectly clear. You are constantly talking about confidence and keep on saying that you can have confidence only if you know where something or other is situated, where it can be verified and so forth. But I say to you, and I think that everyone else will say the same, that first and foremost there must be confidence that the disarmament process will go on without interruption. If there is no guarantee of this, there will be no confidence in the treaty. That is why we demand that the transition from one stage to another must be on the basis of a normal decision by a qualified majority and, secondly, that there must be a time limit for the whole disarmament process. Otherwise there can be no real treaty on general and complete disarmament. That is where we differ in approach and in our positions.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Of course, I shall gladly listen to further comments on the part of the United States representative after he has carefully studied our statement of today. But I think that from what I have already said and from what has been said by the United States representative at the last meeting and today, it is already clear that our positions are different. In my opinion, the difference is not to the advantage of the United States position. It is, of course, for you to judge.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I only want to make a brief comment following on the exchange of views to which we have just listened -- I am sure all of us with interest -- on this question of the use or requirement of the veto. It is obviously an important issue, and one to which we have all got to give a great deal of thought as to whether or not it is necessary to include a veto in the provisions of the council of the international disarmament organization. The Soviet representative seemed to me to be arguing in his last statement in a way which was a trifle illogical. I think this has been made clear in one or two interventions earlier not only by our United States colleague but by the representative of India when he spoke on 14 May.

The representative of India said:

"We would agree with the representative of the United States in essence that unless the first stage had been satisfactorily completed it would be unrealistic to expect the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly, as leaders of the two great military alliances today, to go forward to the subsequent stage of the plan". (ENDC/PV.36, page 29)

He went on to say: "We accept that view, which is essentially realistic." (ibid.) I think we would all recognize that this is so, and that certainly no great Power, if it saw that others were not implementing the treaty, would go forward. Therefore, whatever the form, if the plan is not being complied with States will find it essential to draw back for their own security. That seems to me to be a simple and a basic assumption.

Our Soviet colleague was arguing most strongly that there was no need to rely on the veto. Yet in article 40, as our United States colleague points out, there is this direct reference to the Security Council. There we read:

"All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present treaty ...". (ENDC/2, page 25)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Quite obviously the Security Council is charged already with matters relating to international peace and security of a general nature affecting States throughout the world. This is well known; there is therefore no need to underwrite it in this treaty. But this is a specific reference to it in relation to this treaty.

I listened with care to our Soviet colleague's statement that there would be no need to invoke the veto in this case of transition. If that is so I am really rather puzzled as to why the reference to the Security Council appears in this particular article. It seemed to me, to follow the logic of his argument, that there was no need to have a reference to the Security Council in this article at all. No doubt he will enlighten us further on this. It does seem to me that this is an important factor. In fact my own feeling is that the two sides are not so far apart in relation to this particular point of the veto as our Soviet colleague appeared to be making out in his last statement. I believe this matter has got to be covered in some way, whether in the way provided for in the United States plan or in the way which I believe is provided for in article 40 of the Soviet plan. I think there will have to be some check, in case any State -- a major State in particular -- does not carry out its plan in the first stage, before transition to the second stage, or in the second stage before transition to the third. I believe this is basic, and I believe we have to face up to the problem involved in it. My only reason for speaking at this point is that I feel our Soviet colleague rather over-stressed his case in regard to what he alleged was a basic difference and what I believe, when one analyses it closely, does not in fact exist.

Mr. LALL (India): I think it would give the Committee a reference to my full views on this subject if I were to add a few sentences to the part which Mr. Godber quoted from my statement yesterday. Immediately after the two sentences which he was good enough to refer to, I went on to say, using a word to join the two sentences:

"But surely, if we had the normal voting arrangement of the United Nations, namely, a two-thirds majority in the control body or in the international disarmament organization, that provision would give sufficient assurance that there would be no incautious or blind movement from one stage to another without due consideration of the progress which had been achieved in the first stage of the plan and then, later, in the second stage and so on."

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I apologise if I appeared to misrepresent the representative of India. I am always getting in trouble for doing this with various representatives. It is certainly not my intention to do so. Although I may not give full quotations, I always try to give the reference so that representatives may look it up themselves. I did not wish to misrepresent the view of the representative of India, but the sentences to which I referred seemed to me to be particularly applicable to the argument I was developing.

Mr. LALL (India): I did not mean to suggest Mr. Godber was misrepresenting my view; I merely thought that I should state my whole view.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-seventh plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hajek, the representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, India and the United Kingdom.

"In accordance with the procedural arrangements adopted by the Conference on 14 March 1962 (ENDC/1, paragraphs 3 and 4) all documents and final verbatim records of the Conference distributed as of 30 April will be made available to all Members of the United Nations and for public use on 18 May 1962 through the United Nations Secretariat at Geneva and New York.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 10 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.